emphasis; he lent support to its candidates without charting a particular course that it should take. Though not without qualification, this support amounted to a particularly generous and energetic program on behalf of his party's candidates, identifying Reagan as dedicated to the duties of party leadership to an extent that was unusually great by comparison with other modern presidents. His popularity helped the party, as did his successful contribution to the dissemination of the message that the party's approach to economics-previously often seen as responsive to an elite-offered more promise of renewed and increased prosperity to many ordinary Americans than did the policies of the Democrats. The difference that Reagan made as a result of his political activity was significant but his impact was in some respects limited, especially because it was not at all straightforward to share his personal popularity with the party at large. Beyond Reagan, within the administration there was some imaginative engagement with the party's electoral prospects, especially in connection with the new problem of the "gender gap." The success of these efforts did not match the larger success of Reagan's work for the party, and this gender gap proved to be largely resistant to such initiatives.
However, despite its significance, Reagan's contribution was not enough for some Republicans. There were frustrations among movement conservatives and congressional Republicans that Reagan did not do more to revitalize the party according to their respective designs. These frustrations led to activities that aimed more proactively to build the party's coalition, but that actually undermined Republican efforts to maximize the benefits of the Reagan legacy. Such disappointments with Reagan reflected a misinterpretation of the political opportunity that Republicans encountered in the 1980s. Although this period of opportunity provided party gains, it began primarily with disillusionment with the Democrats, rather than any notable pattern of pro-Republican conversion.
The background to the confidence at the start of the 1980s in the party's future chiefly involved the travails of the Democratic Party and of liberalism. In the late 1970s there were certainly many signs-encouraging to the Republicans-of a turn away from liberalism. Opinion polls reported a mood of increasing skepticism toward government activism. One polling organization, for example, found in 1973 that about a third of respondents agreed "the best government is the government that governs least," but in 1981 that this proportion had risen to three in five. There was a conservative trend, too, at the end of the 1970s, in attitudes on social issues, including drugs, abortion, and the Equal Rights Amendment. This trend was of a rather glacial nature, however, by comparison with the pronounced transformation of ideas about foreign policy. While in 1973 only about one in five Americans viewed the Soviet Union in a highly negative way, by the start of 1980 this proportion had increased to more than three in five.
3 Disappointments with the Carter administration encouraged a new willingness to turn to the Republicans. A National Republican Congressional Committee poll in June 1980 found that voters now had more confidence in Republicans than in
